UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-5-2012

Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Enterprises
Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40034

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Enterprises Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40034" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3966.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3966

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 40034-2012

THE BANK OF COMMERCE,
an Idaho banking corporation
Respondent,

vs.
JEFFERSON ENTERPRISES, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Bannock County.
Honorable Robert C. Naftz, District Judge, Presiding.
A. Bruce Larson
ABLE LAW PC
Attorneys at Law
155 South 2nd Ave.
P.O. Box 6369
Pocatello, ID 83205-6369
Attorney for Appellant

Douglas R. Nelson
Brian T. Tucker
NELSON HALL PARRY
TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 40034-2012

THE BANK OF COMMERCE,
an Idaho banking corporation
Respondent,

vs.

JEFFERSON ENTERPRISES, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court ofthe Sixth Judicial District for Bannock County.
Honorable Robert C. Nafiz, District Judge, Presiding.
A. Bruce Larson
ABLE LAW PC
Attorneys at Law
155 South21ld Ave.
P.O. Box 6369
Pocatello, ID 83205-6369

Douglas R. Nelson
Brian T. Tucker
NELSON HALL PARRY
TUCKER, P.A.
490 Memorial Drive
P.O. Box 51630
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630

Attorney for Appellant
Attorneys for Respondent

T ABLE OF CONTENTS
1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
B. Course of Proceedings
C. Statement of Facts

2

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.
A.The District Court erred in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment
dismissing the Counterclaim of Jefferson in that establish:
B. Request for Attorney Fees as an Issue on Appeal.
III. ARGUMENT.

7
7
7
7

A. Standard of Review

7

B. Breach of Contract

10

C. Interference with a Prospective Economic Advantage

13

D. Fraud and Misrepresentation

15

E. Promissory Estoppel

17

F. Damages

18

G. Novation

20

IV. CONCLUSION

21

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Pagei

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Argvle 1'. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670-71, 691 P.2d 1283, 1285-86 (Ct. App. 1984) ................. 9
Ashby 1'. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 70, 593 P.2d 402, 405 (1979) .................................................... 9
Brown v. City o./Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,229 P.3d 1164, (2010) ............................................. 18
Cantwell v. Oty o.fBoise, 146 Idaho 127, at 138,191 P.3d 205, at 216, Idaho ........................... 13
Commercial Ventures, Inc. 1'. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Fami(v Trust, 145 Idaho 208,217, 177 P.3d
955,964 (2008) ......................................................................................................................... 14
Estate o.fBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 525, 96 P.3d 623, 626 (2004) ................................. 8
Fairchild v. Mathews, 91 Idaho 1,415 P.2d 43 (1966); Allan Steel Supply Co. v. Bradley, 89
Idaho 29,402 P.2d 394 (1943) .................................................................................................. 20
Fazzio v. Mason, 150 Idaho 591,249 P.3d 390 (Idaho,2011) ........................................................ 8
G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991) ................. 9
Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.3d 172,175 (2007) (citing Carnell v.
Barker A1gmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 327, 48 P.3d 651, 656 (2002)) ........................................... 9
Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237, 280 P.3d 740, (2012) ........................................................... 10
Harris v. State, Dep't. of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,298,847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992); ... 9
Harris v. Wildcat Corp., 97 Idaho 884,556 P.2d 67, (1976) ........................................................ 20
Heckman v. Boise Valley Livestock Comm'n Co., 92 Idaho 862,452 P.2d 359 (1969) ............... 20
Id. at 15, 175 P.3d at 177 (citing McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, LLC,
144 Idaho 219, 221, 159 P.3d 856,858 (2007)) ....................................................................... 10
Id. at 338-39,986 P.2d at 1004-05 (alteration and emphasis in the original) (quoting Kutcher v.
Zimmerman, 87 Hawaii 394, 957 P.2d 1076,1088 n. 16 (Haw.Ct.App.1998)) ....................... 15
Id. at 340,986 P.2d at 1006 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. d (1977)) ........ 15
Idaho First Nat'l Bankv. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 286,824 P.2d 841, 861 (1991)
................................................................................................................................................... 14
Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 1216 (2000) ............ 11
In Highland Enters., Inc. v. Barker ............................................................................................... 14
McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991) ................................................... 9
O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008) (citing West
Wood Invs., Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75,82, 106 P.3d 401,408 (2005)) ................................. 10
Opportunity, L.L.c. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 38 P.3d 1258, (2002) ................................... 20
Shawver v. Hucklebeny Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354,360,93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004) .................. 7
Stoddartv. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, 149 Idaho 679, 683, 239 P.3d 784,788 (2010) .............. 8
Taylor v. Browning, 129 Idaho 483, 490, 927 P.2d 873, 880 (1996) (citing Idaho First Nat'l.
Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 288,824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991)) .......................... 12
Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994) ................................................. 9
Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881,243 P.3d 1069 (2010) ........................... 15
Williams v. Computer Res., Inc., 123 Idaho 671, 673, 851 P.2d 967,969 (1993) .......................... 8
Statutes
I.C. § 12-120(3) ................................................................................................................................ 7
I.e. §9-505 .................................................................................................................................... 17

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Page ii

1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A. Nature ofthe Case
This is a case brought by the Bank of Commerce (hereinafter referred to as "Bank"), to
foreclose real estate mortgages against Appellant, Jefferson Enterprises, LLC, (hereinafter
"Jefferson").] The case before this Court is an appeal from the decision of the District Court
granting the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Jefferson's Counterclaims.
J efferson's counterclaim and affinnative defenses raise factual issues based upon breach of
contract, interference with a prospective contract, fraud and misrepresentation, and promissory
estoppel. Jefferson also raised an affinnative defense in its Amended Answer and Counterclaim
(the illegality of the Bank's actions) that was not addressed by the Bank in its motion for
summary judgment or the District Court in its decision dismissing Jefferson's counterclaim.
B. Course of Proceedings

The Bank filed an action to foreclose two mortgages that were entered into by the
Jefferson. The Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the District Court to enter
judgment in its favor, or in the alternative, to grant Jefferson partial summary judgment on the
grounds that there were no genuine issue of material fact and it should be entitled to summary
judgment as a matter oflaw.
The Jefferson responded to the Motion with affidavits, depositions and memoranda of
law. Following oral argument, the District COUli granted the Motion, dismissed the Jefferson's
Counterclaim and entered judgment in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, the Jefferson timely moved
the Court for an order vacating the judgment and for reconsideration. The motion after briefing

1 Designation

of the parties used by the trial court LAR. 35(d)
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and argument was denied. As a result Jefferson has appealed from the January 17, 2012,
Memorandum Decision and Order; the January 17, 2012. Judgment, the April 19, 2012,
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Reconsider; the April 19, 2012, Decree of
Foreclosure and Order of Sale; the April 19, 2012, Memorandum Decision and Order on
Attorney Fees and Costs; and the April 19,2012, Judgment Re: Attorney Fees & Costs.
C. Statement of Facts.

Dustin Morrison is the owner and managing member of Jefferson. Dustin Morrison is
also the owner and managing member of American Dream Home Builders, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Company nlk/a ADHD, LLC.

The LLC is in the business of developing

residential subdivisions and constructing residential homes. Dustin Morrison is also the sole
shareholder and officer of American Dream Construction, Inc. The corporation is in the business
of developing residential subdivisions and constructing residential homes in conjunction with
American Dream. Jefferson Enterprises and the other described entities are interrelated to the
extent that their common financial ability to succeed is influenced by the ongoing projects,
monetary reserves and credit worthiness of all of the entities. 2 The bank relied upon the financial
relationship of Jefferson, Dustin Morrison, and the other related entities in its decision to loan
money to Jefferson.
In May of 2005, Jefferson became the sole owner and managing member of Southern
Hills Development Co., LLC. Southern Hills was the owner of an option to purchase real

2 Depo. Wortonpp. 18; Clerk's Record p. 396. Depo. M. Morrison pp.
45; Clerk's Record p. 333. The bank relied upon the financial
relationship of Jefferson, Dustin Morrison, and the other related entities
in its decision to loan money to Jefferson.
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property which is referred to as the "Wood" parcel. Southem Hills was also the owner of a
substantial portion of the 80 Acres, Inc., a subdivision of the City of Pocatello, Idaho (referred to
as the "80 Acre" parcel). All of the rights, title and interest in Southem Hills and in the Wood
and 80 Acre parcels were transferred to Jefferson.
The 80 Acre parcel was subject to a financing arrangement with exceptionally favorable
terms and conditions. The terms of the financing included a very low interest rate that was
capitalized into the note together with low annual payments. 3 Jefferson assumed those favorable
financial arrangements. According to Dustin Morrison "there was not one dollar incentive to pay
that off one day early. ,,4
In the early part of 2006, Jefferson negotiated with the Bank through one of its Vice
Presidents, Steve Worton, for the purpose of the obtaining financing to exercise the option and to
purchase the Wood property. Prior to the negotiations with the Bank, a "Master Plan" for
development of the Southem Hills Project combining the Wood parcel and the 80 Acre parcel
had been submitted and approved by the City of Pocatello. At the time, the plan was the largest
single development in southeastem Idaho. s At the time the loan was being negotiated with the
Bank, an iillnexation Agreement was being negotiated between Morrison and the City of
Pocatello. Among other things, the Annexation Agreement provided for utilities, sewer and the
joint development of a water system that included at least two large water storage tanks.
Compliance with the tenns of the Master Plan and the Almexation Agreement obligated
Jefferson to spend millions of dollars to comply and complete the development. Jefferson and the
related entities spent large sums of money for the 80 Acre property acquisition, engineering,

Depo. Worton Ex. 21; Clerk's Record p. 418
Depo. D. Morrison pp. 28-29; Clerk's Record p. 459
5 Depo. D. Morrison. p.25; Clerk's Record p. 458
3

4
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surveying, preparation of plats and other actions necessary to obtain the Annexation Agreement
and the approval of the City of Pocatello for the Southem Hills Master Plan. 6
A loan proposal was submitted by the Morrisons and Jefferson to the Bank for the
purpose of funding the purchase of the Wood property. The deadline to exercise the option to
purchase the property was May 10, 2006. The owner of the property was not willing to extend
the option past the deadline. In the event the option was not exercised and the Wood property not
purchased, Jefferson would not be able to develop the Southem Hills Project and the
expenditures described above would be lost. Wood had extended the option on two other
occasions but refused any further extensions. 7
The loan proposal included volumes of documents relating to the Southem Hills Project
together with tax retums, financial analysis, appraisals, and projected profits. Interestingly the
Bank accepted the Jefferson documents and treated the same as the loan application. s
The application provided that the Bank's position would be subject to the 80 Acre
mortgage. Some time prior to May 8, 2006, Steve Worton, on behalf of the Bank, infonlled
Jefferson that the loan pertaining to the Southem Hills Project had been approved by the Bank.
The only variance from the written request made by Jefferson was that the amount of the loan
would be reduced to approximately $2,200,000.00 and the tenn of the loan would be for one
year. The Bank's communicated approval specifically recognized the written application made by
Jefferson which provided, among other things, that the Bank would have a second mortgage on
the 80 Acre parcel. The acceptance of the application on the stated basis preserved the favorable
financing arrangement enjoyed by Jefferson as well as leaving intact other liquid assets of

Depo. D. Morrison. p. 25. 26; Clerk's Record p. 458-159
7 Depo. D. Morrison. pp. 32-33; Clerk's Record p. 492
8 Depo. p. Worton p. 19; Clerk's Record p. 394
6
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Jefferson, the related entities and the Morrisons. The liquid assets were needed for the
completion of the Southem Hills project and to fund other ongoing real estate developments of
the other related entities. 9
The Ba..11k recognized the financial interrelationship of Jefferson to the other business
entities of the Morrisons combining the financial information to determine debt to asset ratios,
capacity and working capital.

Based upon the written application, the Bank, through Steve

Worton, acknowledged acceptance. Jefferson had a clear understanding that the new loan from
the Bank would be subordinate to the existing 1st mortgage on the 80 Acre parcel. Jefferson
accepted the modified terms and discontinued the pursuit of other financing options with DL
Evans Bank. Following the communication of acceptance from the Bank and less than 48 hours
prior to the time the option on the Wood parcel was to expire, the Bank changed its position and
demanded that it be placed in a first lien position on the 80 Acre parcel. Jefferson was facing the
prospect of catastrophic loss if the Wood option was not exercised. Jefferson was compelled by
the wrongful acts of the Bank at the last hour to use substantially all of its liquid assets and the
liquid assets of the related entities to payoff the obligation on the 80 Acre parcel thereby placing
the Bank's mortgage in a first lien position on the property.
The Bank admits that its actions impacted the financial ability of Jefferson and the other
related businesses to continue their operations by consuming its liquid financial capacity to
continue the project or obtain additional investment to complete the project. The Bank's
procedures required that the financial ability of a borrower such as Jefferson be analyzed to
determine if it would qualify for the loan. The Bank in its deposition explained the scope of the

9

Depo. Wake pp.23-24; Clerk's Record p. 427
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analysis. 10 Jefferson's combined financial infonnation met the lending criteria of the Bank based
upon the assumption that the capacity and working capital would not be reduced. However, when
the Bank demanded that Jefferson use its working capital to payoff the 80 Acre mortgage the
financial ability of Jefferson to service the loan was compromised. Under these circumstances
the Bank would not have approved the loan.

11

Jefferson's loss in liquidity capacity and working capital was caused by the Bank's
breach of the agreement to lend leaving the favorable 80 Acre financing in place with its
insistence on being in first position of 80 Acre parcel. The breach caused damages to Jefferson's
credit worthiness and stifled Jefferson's ability to attract other investment in the propertyI2.
As a further inducement Worton represented that the Bank would not let Jefferson fail and would
provide a means to replace the loss of working capital and financial ability. (D. Morrison Depo.
pp.70-73.)

The representation by the Bank through Worton was made prior to the time the loan was
to close and the time the Wood parcel was to be purchased. Worton induced Jefferson to follow
this course of action by misrepresenting that the Bank would not let Jefferson fail and would
provide additional financing. The Bank refused to provide any additional financing to Jefferson
for the completion of the Southern Hills Project. As a result of the Bank's blatant deviation from
its own policies and procedures and commonly recognized lending standards and other wrongful
conduct, Jefferson lost the ability to take advantage of foreseeable prospective economic
opportunities related to the 80 Acre parcel, the Southern Hills Project and other real estate
developments.

Depo. M. Morrison pp.64-69; Clerk's Record p. 352-358
Depo. Worton p. 73; Clerk's Record p. 409
12 Depo. D. Morrison p. 77-78; Clerk's Record p 440-441
10

11
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.
A. The District Court erred in granting the Motion for SummarY Judgment dismissing the
Counterclaim of Jefferson in that establish:

1. There are disputed material issues of fact and issues of law that show the Plaintiff
breached its contract with Jefferson;
2. The Bank intentionally interfered with a prospective economic advantage of Jefferson;
3. The Bank's action was barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel;
5. The Bank committed fraud and misrepresentation;
4. That Jefferson was damaged by the actions of the Bank;
5. The District Court's detenninations dismissing the affinnative defenses raised by the
Jefferson on the Bank's Motion for Summary judgment were erroneous and not based upon
substantial evidence.
6. The District Court erred in deternlining that the Bank's Mortgage should be foreclosed
in that there are disputed materials of fact that would have precluded the entry of summary
judgment allowing the foreclosure.
B. Request for Attornev Fees as an Issue on Appeal.

1. Plaintiff requests an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to the provisions of
LC.§12-120(3) and LA.R. Rule 41.
III. ARGUMENT.
A. Standard of Review.

APPELLANT'S BRlEF

Page 7

On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary jud2::,'menL this Court utilizes the same
standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Shavliver

1'.

Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004). Smmnary judgment is

proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56(c). Movant has the burden of shO\ving that no
genuine issues of material fact exist. Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 2j, 149 Idaho 679, 683,
239 P.3d 784,788 (2010). This Court "liberally construe[sJ the record in a light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of that party." Vv'hen
ruling on a motion for summary judbTInent, disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of
the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be
drawn in favor of the non-moving party. SUlmnary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact. When the record shows the existence of genuine and
material issues of fact and the record contains conflicting inferences or if reasonable minds might
reach different conclusions the moving party is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Fazzio v. Mason, 150 Idaho 591, 249 P.3d 390 (Idaho,2011). Summary judgment is appropliate

"if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts and reasonable inferences are
construed in favor of the non-moving party. Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 525,
96 P.3d 623, 626 (2004).
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The court is not pennitted to make conclusive findings with regard to issues upon which
the parties submit conflicting evidence. See Williams v. COlnputer Res., Inc., 123 Idaho 671, 673,
851 P.2d 967, 969 (1993) (holding that the trial court was not pennitted to draw inferences
regarding the parties' intent when the parties submitted conflicting evidence on the issue); Ashby
1".

Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 70, 593 P.2d 402,405 (1979) (holding that a question involving the

"intention expressed by the acts and statements of the parties" was a factual question for the
jury); Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670-71, 691 P.1d 1283, 1285-86 (et. App. 1984)
(holding that findings based on conflicting evidence may only be made on summary judgment
when "the evidence is entirely confined to a written record, there is no additional, in-court
testimony to be obtained, and the trial judge alone will be responsible for choosing the
evidentiary facts he deems most probable"). [W]hen a party moves for summary judgment, the
initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with that pmiy.
Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960,963 (1994) ("The burden of proving the
absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving party."); See also Harris v. State,
Deplt. of Health & We{fare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992); McCoy v. Lyons,
120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360,364 (1991); G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho
514,517,808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991). Thus, it follows that if the moving party fails to challenge an
element of the nomnovant's case, the initial burden placed on the moving party has not been met
and therefore does not shift to the nonmovant.
The admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold matter to be addressed by the court
before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to detennine whether the
evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Page 9

Idaho 10,13,175 P.3d 172,175 (2007) (citing Carnell.,. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322,
327, 48 P.3d 651, 656 (2002)). "This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard when
reviewing a trial court's determination of the admissibility of testimony offered in connection
with a motion for summary judf,'1nent." Id. at 15. 175 P.3d at 177 (citing McDaniel)'. Inland
Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 221, 159 P.3d 856, 858 (2007)). "A
trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2)
acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the
decision through an exercise of reason." O'Connor)'. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909,
188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008) (citing West Wood

1711'S.,

Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 82, 106 P.3d

401,408 (2005)); Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237,280 P.3d 740, (2012).

B. Breach of Contract.
The District Court determined that Jefferson's claim for breach of contract was barred by
operation of the "Statute of Frauds,,13 The District Court in its Memorandum Decision and order
specifically found as follows: "This Court has also accepted as true that the conditions of the
loan agreement provided, among other things, that the Bank would be secured on the 80 Acre
parcel in a second priority position. In addition, this Court accepted as true that Jefferson had
made application for a loan in the amount of $2,800,000 from the Bank. ,,14 The Bank agreed
to loan money to Jefferson in accordance with the tenns and conditions of the Board's approval
of Jefferson's loan application. The conditions of the loan agreement provided, among other
things, that the Bank would be secured on the 80 Acre parcel in a second lien priority position

13r. C. § 5-905
14 Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Reconsider p. 5;
Clerk's Record p. 722
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subject to the existing advantageous financing on the parcel. The Mortgage prepared by the Bank
\\'ith and effective date of May 9,2006 specifically provided that:
"6. rrARRANTY OF TITLE. "Mortgagor covenants that Mortgager is lm-t:fully
seized of the estate conveyed by this Mortgage and has the right to grant,
bargain, conveJ', sell and mortgage this Propert), and warrants that the
Property is unencumbered except for encumbrances of record.
***
8. PRIOR SECURITY INTERESTS. With regard to any other mortgage, deed
of trust, security agreement or other lien document that created a security
interest on encumbrance on the Property and that may have priority over this
Mortgage, Mortgagor agrees:
A. To make all payments when due and to peTform or comply with all
covenants.
B. To promptly deliver to Lender any notices that the Mortgagor
receives from the holder.
C. Not make orpermit any modification or extension of, and not request
or accept any future advances under any note or agreement secured by, the
other mortgage,deed of trust or security agreement unless Lender consents in

writing". 15
Jefferson accepted the Bank's Mortgage and the material tenns, including the second priority
position, became binding on the Bank. Therefore, based upon the factual findings of the District
Court, a written agreement (the Mortgage) existed and was effective on May 9, 2006. The
Mortgage provided that encumbrances of record, such as the 80 Acre encumbrance, would have
priority over the lien of the Bank's Mortgage. The District Court, even though there was
substantial evidence in the record to the contrary, disposed of the breach of contract count based
upon the Statute of Frauds. The District Courts detem1ination that the statute of frauds barred
recovery, taking into account the factual finding referred to in this brief, is clearly erroneous and
unsupported.
The agreement found to exist by the District Court, by operation of law, contains the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing together with the requirements, established

15

Mortgage Clerk's Transcript p. 14
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policies and procedures of the Bank and its Board and recognized commercial lending standards
and practices. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is " ... implied by law in the
parties' contract." Idaho Power Co.

Y.

Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 1216

(2000). The covenant "arises only regarding terms agreed to by the parties." Taylor

y.

Browning,

129 Idaho 483, 490, 927 P.2d 873, 880 (1996) (citing Idaho First Nat'!. Bank v. Bliss Valley
Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 288,824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991)). "The covenant requires that the parties

perfonn, in good faith, the obligations imposed by their agreement". Idaho Power Co., 134 Idaho
738,750,9 p.3d 1204, 1216. The detennination of whether the covenant has been breached is an
objective detennination of whether the parties have acted in good faith in tenns of enforcing the
contractual provisions. Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 243 P .3d 1069
(2010). The Bank breached the tenns and conditions of the lending agreement by changing its
position and requiring Jefferson to payoff the existing loan on the 80 Acre parcel. The change
of position of the Barlie was timed in such a marmer that Jefferson was unable to seek alternate
financing to exercise the option to purchase the Wood property. Based upon the documentation
contained in the loan application, confirmed by the terms of the Mortgage and other information
provided to the Bar1k by Morrisons and Jefferson, it was reasonably foreseeable that the breach
would cause damages to Jefferson.
The Bank attempts to use the Statute of Frauds argument to shield itself from what it
claims are oral agreements about the issue of priority. However, the statements of the Bar1k
about the Bank's requirement of priority of the Mortgage are in fact barred by the Statute of
Limitation. The Bank did not provide a writing to Jefferson at any time prior to the day of the
closing that informed Jefferson that the Bank would require the subordination of the 80 Acre
mortgage or that it would have to be in a first security position on the property.
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The oral

demands of the Bank forcing Jefferson to payoff the 80 Acre encumbrance did not exist in
writing prior to the effective date of the Mortgage.

C. Interference with a Prospective Economic Advantage.
The District Court found that: "The Court finds that there was a valid economic

expectancy by Jefferson and that the Bank was aware of that expectanc.v. " The Bank, acting
contrary to its established policies and procedures and recognized commercial lending standards,
wrongfully breached the terms and conditions of the loan agreement based upon the acceptance
of Jefferson's documentation. The change in the Bank's position, requiring Jefferson to use
existing liquid cash reserves to place the Bank in a first position on the 80 Acre parcel, materially
interfered with Jefferson's foreseeable prospective economic advantage stemming from the
favorable existing financing on the property, the business opportunities of the related entities
owned by the Morrisons and its ability to complete the Southern Hills project.
Interference with a prospective economic advantage can be demonstrated by showing (1)
the existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the
interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing ternlination of the expectancy, (4) the
interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself, (5)
resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted.

Cantvvell v. City of

Boise, 146 Idaho 127, at 138, 191 P.3d 205, at 216, Idaho.
The decision of the District Court found that Jefferson had a valid the economIC
expectancy." The expectancy resulted from the favorable financial conditions of the 80 Acre
financing agreement and the preservation of Jefferson financial capacity to service the loan with
the Bank and to continue to operate the businesses of the related entities. The District Court also
found that the Bank had knowledge of the expectancy in that, by its own calculations, it knew of
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the advantage enjoyed by Jefferson and knew that Jefferson's financial capacity would be
negatively impacted by its actions to change its position on the loan just before it was to close.
The Bank had knowledge that the financial basis for extending the loan was thwarted by the
demand that the 80 Acre encumbrance be paid off from the working capital of Jefferson and the
related entities which was relied upon by the Bank to approve the loan.

The Barile's intentional

actions to require the 80 Acre parcel loan to be paid off with full knowledge of the economic
consequences was intentional interference inducing tennination of the economic expectancy.
The Bank's intentional breach of the tenus of the loan agreement found to exist by the District
Court and the specific ternlS of the Mortgage was wrongful. The Bank followed a course of
action that crippled the financial capacity of Jefferson. Finally, the Bank's actions in reducing
Jefferson's ability to service the Bank's loan and either market or develop the Southern Hills
project disrupted the economic expectancy and caused obvious damage to Jefferson. Jefferson
had no operating capital. The favorable financing ternlS on the 80 Acre parcel were lost.
Jefferson's ability to obtain credit or other sources of capital were lost, the financial ability of
Jefferson's related entities was lost. Jefferson was unable to meet the obligation to the Bank, was
required to borrow more money to pay the interest on the loan. All of these consequences of the
Banks actions caused catastrophic loss to Jefferson.
A party claiming intentional inteIference resulting in wrongful injury, may offer proof
that either "(1) the defendant had an improper objective or purpose to harnl the plaintiff; or (2)
the defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective business relationship."

Idaho First Nat'! Bankv. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 286, 824 P.2d 841,861 (1991).
However, an enforceable contract need not be shown to exist, just a valid economic expectancy.

Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex A1. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 217, 177 P.3d
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955, 964 (2008). In Highland Enters., Inc. ,', Barker, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that the
proper standard for the "knowledge of the expectancy" element necessary to make a claim of
intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage is not actual knowledge. 133
Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996,1004 (1999), Instead, the knowledge element may be "'satisfied
by actual knowledge of the prospective [economic advantage] or by knowledge "of facts which
would lead a reasonable person to believe that such interest exists." , Id. at 338-39, 986 P.2d at
1004-05 (alteration and emphasis in the original) (quoting Kutcher v. Zimmennan, 87 Hawaii
394,957 P.2d 1076, 1088 n. 16 (Haw.Ct.App.1998)). Intent may be demonstrated if it is shown
that the actor desires to bring about the interference, or "knows that the interference is certain or
substantially certain to occur as a result of his action." Id. at 340, 986 P .2d at 1006 (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. d (1977)) "Intent can be shown even if the interference
is incidental to the actor's intended purpose and desire 'but known to him to be a necessary
consequence of his action.' ". Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. j. (1977));
Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 243 P.3d 1069 (2010). Based upon the

facts and circumstances of this case, the Bank possessed knowledge that the success of the
Southern Hills project depended upon the purchase of the Wood property and the ability of
Jefferson and the other Morrison entities to financially succeed.

The actions of the Bank

intentionally, with full knowledge of the facts and contrary to its lending policies, caused the
abrupt and devastating loss of financial viability to Jefferson.
D. Fraud and Misrepresentation.
The disputed material issues of fact in this case show that the Bank and its authOlized
representatives owed a duty to Jefferson to speak the whole truth and to not intentionally mislead
them or conceal material facts in communications regarding the tenns and conditions of the loan
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or the Bank's ability and intention to further finance the Southern Hills project. The Bank and its
officers made the materially false representation that the Bank had abrreed to accept a second lien
position on the 80 Acre parcel allowing Jefferson to profit benefit from the existing favorable
financing arrangement and to preserve its ability to use its liquid assets. The Bank intentionally
or negligently concealed the fact that it would or could change its position on the 80 Acre parcel
until Jefferson was out of time to exercise the Wood option stating to Jefferson, to Pam Wake, to
the mortgage broker, and to others that the Board of Directors had approved the loan and agreed
to accept the second priority position on the 80 Acre parcel. The Bank repudiated the agreement
less than 48 hours prior to the loan closing and the expiration of the option to purchase the Wood
property.
The Bank, as part of the loan application, had been provided comprehensive financial
statements concerning Morrison, Jefferson and the other related entities. The liquid assets shown
in the financial statements were necessary for the approval of the loan and critical to the ability
of Jefferson to perform its obligations to the Bank. With full knowledge of Jefferson's financial
position, the Bank acted to cause the removal of the underlying liquid assets (used to pay off the
prior lien holder on the 80 Acre parcel) and caused Jefferson and the other related parties to lose
the ability to proceed with Southern Hills Development and other projects. The timing of the
change of position prevented Jefferson from seeking other financing to fund the purchase of the
Wood property. Steve Worton had represented that the liquid cash available to Jefferson would
remain intact and not be affected by the new loan. After the Bank's sudden change in position,
Steve Worton represented that the Bank would provide additional financing to alleviate the
financial burden caused by its last minute change in position which required Jefferson to
practically exhaust its reserve of liquid assets. Based upon the Bank's representation through its
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officer and Vice President, Jefferson materially changed its position and used the liquid cash
assets of Morrison and the related entities to payoff the first lien holder on the 80 Acre parcel.
The Bank subsequently refused to provide financing to alleviate Jefferson's loss of working
capital caused by the Bank's change of position just prior to the closing of the loan. All of the
representations, acts of concealment and other acts of wrongful conduct were made by
authorized representatives of the Bank, including but not limited to Steve Worton, with the intent
or the reasonable expectation that Jefferson would rely thereon. In fact, Jefferson did rely upon
such false information to its damage, loss and detriment. The Bank, its officers and its Board,
based upon the above allegations, lacked reasonable grounds to believe that the representations
to Jefferson and the facts it concealed contained true and accurate infom1ation and therefore
acted with reckless disregard for Jefferson's rights knowing with reasonable probability that
Jefferson and its related entities would be financially crippled by the Bank's actions.
E. Promissory Estoppel.
The District Court based its decision to deny relief on the basis of its determination that
the Statute of Frauds barred the affirmative defense. The District Court stated that: "The Court

has previously determined that Idaho Code §9-505 is the controlling law when it relates to any
agreement regarding a promise or commitment to loan money. The Statute of Frauds requires
a writing in order to enforce reliance upon agreed tenns. The Court has determined that no
such pre-commitment writing existed and that only the loan agreement entered into by the
Bank and Jefferson can be considered for pUlposes of reliance and enforceability. ,,16
The District Court detennined that no pre-commitment writing existed and that only the
loan agreement entered into by the Bank and Jefferson can be considered for purposes of reliance

16

Memorandum Decision and Order, Clerk's Record p.648
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and enforceability. However, the District Court erred when it did not consider the specific temlS
and conditions of the Mortgage that allows for the security to have prior encumbrances of record.
The 80 Acre encumbrance was of record on May 9,2006. I"''
In order to demonstrate promissory estoppel, three elements must be met: '''( 1) the
detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; (2) substantial loss to the
promisee acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) the
promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise as made.' Brown v.
City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 229 P.3d 1164, (2010). The undisputed facts in this case
clearly establish that the Bank knew that Jefferson would rely on the Bank's representations
relating to the financing of the original loan, the ten11S were incorporated into the Mortgage.
Under the circumstances of this case and the facts presented, Jefferson's reliance was reasonable
and justified.
F. Damages.

Jefferson suffered damages which were foreseeable and known to the Bank. Those
damages include:
1. The loss of the favorable terms of the 80 Acre financing agreement.
2. The complete expenditure of Jefferson' operating capital and the financial impact the
expenditure of the capital had on Jefferson's related entities.
3. Jefferson's inability to muster the financial resources to complete the development of
the Southem Hills subdivision.
4. The destruction of Jefferson's and Jefferson's credit worthiness.
Dustin Morrison established these damages in his deposition stating that:

17
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

One is I can't have my cash that's been spent
reimbursed. The other thing is that they have approved
this loan based on, No.1, my income and my capacity to
earn. No.2, my liquidity and ability to debt service
over time because we knew this project wouldn't generate
a dime based on these numbers that I provided the bank
as a break even point of year four or year seven. So it
was going to require debt service for a period of time.
Keep in mind the reimbursement wasn't to come
to my pocket, it was to go to a CD to debt service the
dam loan at Bank of Commerce. That's one issue, I can
live without that issue.
The problem was we have approved you based on
your capacity to earn and your capacity to debt service
this loan and now you fully acknowledge, Steve,
everybody acknowledges there is not an option for
subordination, guys. They are not going to just for
free give up first position, we have to pay this off if
we want first position. In order to pay that off we are
going to liquidate our working capital, which will
substantially affect our ability to earn because we are
a spec home construction company, $700,000 borrows $3
million; right? 20 percent, you know, so whatever, $3.5

Page 72
1 million, I guess.
Q. But you continued to operate after that,
2
3 didn't you?
4
A. No, we suffered, we bled, desperately. So
5 when I told Steve this, you understand there is no way I
6 can maintain my business without my working capital.
7 That working capital will disappear if I do what you are
8 asking me to do. If I don't do what you are asking me
9 to do, I lose this project and every dime that I have
10 spent on this project to date. IS
The undisputed facts clearly establish that the Bank and its officers knew that the loan
that they made to Jefferson would not have been approved without the reserve of working capital
that was held by Jefferson and its related entities.

I9

The Bank's vice president Steve Worton

stated decisively that the Bank would not have approved the loan would not have been approved

18
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by the Bank's Board of Directors knowing that the working capital of the Jefferson had been
dismissed by over $700,000.00.:20 The Bank's unlawful breach of its agreements with Jefferson
financially crippled Jefferson and directly caused the loss and damages described.

G. Noyation.

The Bank's Mortgage effective May 9, 2006 is not a change of the agreement to
subordinate. The Mortgage allows for a subordination. The District Courts finding that a
novation occurred in the transactions fonning the basis of this action is erroneous. The District
Court found that: "Viewing these facts most favorably for Jefferson there were a series of
novations that occurred which changed the terms of the original loan application by
Jefferson, but ultimately Jefferson entered into a loan agreement with the Bank which
extinguished all other pre-loan agreements that may have been contemplated by the parties. ,,21
The making of a new contract does not necessarily abrogate a fonner contract unless it
explicitly rescinds it, deals with the subject matter so comprehensively as to be complete in
itself, or is so inconsistent with the first contract that the two cannot stand together. Moreover,
when a subsequently executed agreement specifically references and relies on a fonner
agreement, the two are to be interpreted together, if possible. Opportunity, L.L. C. v. Ossevvarde,
136 Idaho 602, 38 PJd 1258, (2002). To establish an accord and satisfaction the parties

accepting a new or different obligation must do so knowingly and intentionally. Heclonan v.
Boise Valley Livestock Comm'n Co., 92 Idaho 862, 452 P.2d 359 (1969); Fairchild v. Mathews,

91 Idaho 1,415 P.2d 43 (1966); Allan Steel Supply Co. v. Bradley, 89 Idaho 29, 402 P.2d 394

20
21
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Page 20

(1943). Harris v. \Vildcat Corp., 97 Idaho 884, 556 P.2d 67, (1976). Issues of fact arising from
the circumstances of this case raise the issue of whether or not the elements necessary to find
novation are present from the execution of the subsequent mortgages. The agreements were
entered into with the understanding that the financial loss to Jefferson would be alleviated by the
future acts of the Bartle The modification from the original agreement to loan money to Jefferson
was not intentionally waived but was conditioned on the Bank's representations.

IV. CONCLUSION.
The District Court's decision is not based on substantial evidence and incorrectly applies
the law. The District Court's rulings and judgments should be reversed and this matter remanded
for trial. The disputed facts establish that Jefferson's loan application which was adopted by the
Bank clearly cOlmnunicated that the very favorable terms and conditions of the 80 Acre
financing would remain in a priority position and that the Bank would take a subordinate
position. Jefferson's loan application was in writing and provided specific infonnation about the
80 Acre obligation. The Bank accepted the proposal without the condition of having a first
mortgage on the 80 Acre parcel and the Mortgage prepared by the Bank recognizes that as of
May 9,2006 that the Bank would be subordinate to existing encumbrances of record such as the
80 Acre obligation. The Bank did not communicate in writing at any time prior the effective
date of the Mortgage that it would require the 80 Acre loan to be subordinated to the Bank's
mortgage. The Bank knew that the option to purchase the Wood property would expire on May
10, 2006. Under the circumstances of this transaction, the Bank: knew that if the \Vood option
was not timely exercised that Jefferson's ability to complete the Southern Hills development
would be impossible. The Bank: knew that the 80 Acre lender would not have had any reason to
subordinate its mortgage to the Bank: on new financing. The Bank: knew that by requiring the
APPELLA.NT'S BRIEF
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payoff of the 80 Acre parcel that Jefferson's financial capacity and the financial capacity of the
related entities would be severely and negatively impacted. In fact the Bank would not have
approved the loan under circumstances that required Jefferson to deplete its working capital and
the working capital of the related entities to close the loan.
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that the Orders and Judgments
that are the subj ect 0 f this appeal be reversed and the matter be remanded for trial.
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Dated this 2nd day of November, 2012.

p

A. Bruce Larson, Attorney for Appellant
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